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1  Associate Professor of Government Contracts Law, George Washington University
Law School.  This essay’s catalyst was a series of discussions leading up to a panel presentation
entitled The Contract Disputes Act - A Look to the Future, at the American Bar Association
Section of Public Contact Program, The CDA at Twenty: How’s It Going? Where To Now?, in
Colorado Springs, Colorado, on November 6, 1998.  The discourse involved Chief Judge Loren
A. Smith of the Court of Federal Claims, C. Stanley Dees, Frank Carr, Donald J. Kinlin, and
Richard P. Rector, who deserves special thanks for facilitating these stimulating discussions. 
The author thanks Fred Lees and Heidi Schooner for their helpful comments and Sophia
Zetterlund for her research assistance.
2  41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613.
3  In general, “path dependence” impedes change.  Professor Mark Roe poses the example
of our continued use of the QWERTY keyboard as an example of path dependent behavior.  (The
name refers to the keyboard’s upper left hand keys.)  The frequency with which weaker fingers
type common letters -- for example, the letter “a” -- was advantageous a century ago when keys
jammed easily.   Mark J. Roe, Commentary: Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109
HARVARD L. REV. 641, 643, 648 (1996).  See also, Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive
Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347 (1996) (arguing, among other things, that contract standardization
is a “species of herd behavior” and querying whether “conformity bias leads to standardization of
contract terms”).
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What Next?
A Heuristic Approach to Revitalizing the Contract Disputes Act of 1978
Steven L. Schooner1
I. Introduction: Is It Time For A Change?
For twenty years, government contractors, the public contracts bar, judicial and
administrative benches, and Executive agencies have criticized various aspects of the Contract
Disputes Act of 1978 (CDA).2  Two decades of experience have produced little consensus as to
whether the CDA has proven an effective vehicle for the resolution of contractor claims
permitted by this statutory waiver of government's immunity.  To the contrary, the unmistakable
decline in board litigation may imply a fundamental dissatisfaction with a complex, slow,
expensive, inefficient, process-oriented system that has failed to evolve from its well intentioned,
but arguably ill-conceived, roots.
Because comfort with the status quo effectively stifles wholesale change,3 the basic
4  Minor tweaks have improved, or at least altered, the Act.  After unacceptable delay, a
number of archaic dollar thresholds were addressed in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
of 1994 (FASA), Pub. L. No. 103-355.  FASA increased the certification threshold from $50,000
to $100,000. Pub. L. No. 103-355, § 2531, 108 Stat. 3243 (Oct. 13 1994), amending 41 U.S.C. §
605(a)(1).  Similarly, the threshold for accelerated procedures (which require resolution within
180 days) increased from $50,000 to $100,000, while the expedited procedures (which require,
whenever possible, resolution within 120 days) threshold grew from $10,000 to $50,000.  41
U.S.C. § 607(f), 608(a).  Although the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
may, every three years, review and adjust the expedited small claims threshold,  41 U.S.C. §
608(f), this authority has never been exercised. Other changes (e.g., such as permitting referrals
from District Courts, 41 U.S.C. § 609(f)) have not proved useful.
5   ROBERT T. PEACOCK AND PETER D. TING, CONTRACT DISPUTES ACT: ANNOTATED
(Federal Publications, Inc., 1998), at 1-2, citing H. Rep. No. 1556, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1978). 
For a review of this book and a related discussion of the CDA, see Steven L. Schooner, Book
Review, CONTRACTS DISPUTES ACT: ANNOTATED, by Robert T. Peacock and Peter D. Ting, 28
PUB. CONT. L.J. 117 (1998).
6  Some assert that our current system simply has become too judicialized - that the
system unduly favors due process over speed and cost-effectiveness.  Before the CDA, the
system was less expensive and faster, yet judicial review was available only on appeal for the
small percentage of cases where such proceedings were deemed appropriate.  Perhaps the current
system unduly sacrifices overall efficiency in the interest of due process.
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structure of the 1978 Act remains.4  Surely, the known quantity appears to pose less risk (for all
parties) than the unknown alternative.  As a result, despite frequent efforts to improve the statute,
no universally accepted alternative theory, framework, system, or rubric has developed.
If the statute’s critics have valid reason to perceive that the CDA fails to provide a “fair
and balanced system of administrative and judicial procedures for the settlement of claims and
disputes[,]”5 we should confront that reality.6  In that spirit, this essay suggests a framework for a
meaningful debate over what an improved and invigorated CDA should look like.  This essay
raises more questions than it answers.  Its purpose is heuristic; to frame a debate (which many
feel is long overdue) as to what the CDA should do and how it should do so.  In doing so, I
introduce a recent effort to articulate core principles for government procurement dispute
resolution, then deem the effort an unsatisfactory platform for heuristic analysis.  I next attempt
to determine the necessity for a dispute resolution statute and suggest that the fundamental
purpose for such legislation is no more than to waive the Federal Government’s immunity from
suit.  I then turn to the breadth of an appropriate waiver.  Finally, I examine a number of issues,
such as the nature of judicial and administrative fora and the certification requirement, that
permeate our present system.  I conclude by suggesting, at very least, that we should ask the
difficult questions.
7  Approved at the August 4, 1998 Council Meeting and available on the Section’s web
page at http://www.abanet.org/contract/admin/roc.html.
8  American Bar Association Section of Public Contract Law, “Principles for Resolving
Controversies in Public Procurements,” at http://www.abanet.org/contract/admin/roc.html.
9  American Bar Association Section of Public Contract Law, “Principles for Resolving
Controversies in Public Procurements,” at http://www.abanet.org/contract/admin/roc.html.
10  Some might argue that these principles merely reflect the best attributes of our existing
system.
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II. The ABA Principles: A Starting Point, But Not a Compass
A convenient starting point may be the public contracts bar’s recent effort to lay
cornerstones for such a discussion.  Last year, the American Bar Association Section of Public
Contract Law approved a number of “Principles for Resolving Controversies in Public
Procurements.”7  The ABA “urges all parties to any public acquisition . . . to adhere to the
following principles regarding the resolution of controversies and the availability of remedies at
all stages of the process [and] supports . . . legislation and regulations to implement [them].”8 
The six brief principles recommend that: (1) parties have an obligation to act fairly and in good
faith to resolve controversies and exercise available remedies; (2) the contracting process should
be sufficiently open and well-articulated so as to permit review of both the process and the
reasonableness of decisions; (3) parties have a responsibility to seek resolution of controversies
informally by mutual agreement; (4) parties may agree to resolve controversies through
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes according to lawful terms established by the
parties; (5) parties must have available adequate administrative and judicial processes and
remedies that provide for the independent, impartial, efficient, and just resolution of
controversies; and (6) to provide an adequate remedy when entering into a contract, a
government waives sovereign immunity with regard to controversies arising under or related to
such a contract, except in extraordinary circumstances.9
While these recommendations offer some aspirational guidance, they fall short of
suggesting a foundation for a significant revision to the CDA.  A compelling case can be made
that, under the existing statutory framework, all of the recommendations can be achieved without
Congressional intervention.10  Beyond that, the principles do not offer a useful basis for devising
an optimal structure, because they fail to adequately address the fundamental trade-offs that
frame the debate.
For example, as articulated below, I sense that the last principle – that a waiver of
sovereign immunity is a condition precedent to the existence of a meaningful adversarial system
– must be addressed first.  Absent such a waiver, the preceding principles are rendered moot.
Similarly, it seems strange to pose alternative dispute resolution (principle four) before defining
11  The ABA baldly asserts that “it is essential that the parties have recourse to adequate
administrative and judicial remedies.”  American Bar Association Section of Public Contract
Law, Report to Accompany Principles for Resolving Controversies in Public Procurements,
August 1998 (copy on file with author) (emphasis added).  Surprisingly, the drafters offer no
defense for the need for multiple fora.  The supporting text leaves open the possibility that the
drafters may have deemed essential only recourse to either an administrative or judicial remedy,
so long as what is available proves adequate.  Nonetheless, the ABA holds forth the CDA, with
its election of forum, as a model.
12  Looking ahead, the Section of Public Contract Law recently announced the
reactivation of the CDA Task Force to generate “concrete recommendations on CDA reform.” 
David A. Churchill, News From the Chair, 34 PROC. LAW. 2, 14 (Winter 1999).
13  It may seem unduly conservative to suggest that we should avoid change for change’s
sake or ensure that first, we do no harm. For example, much of the literature of change
management suggests that, at least in the context of competitive business, change is a good unto
itself.  See, e.g., Steven L. Schooner, Book Review: Change, Change Leadership, and Acquisition
Reform, 26 PUB. CONT. L. J.  467 (1997) (discussing three widely read books on change
management).
14  S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5235, 5237. For a more
extensive discussion of the legislative history of the CDA, see the Kipps/Kindness essay ___ in
this issue. 
15  See generally, S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 1 (1978), reprinted in USCCAN 5235.
Specifically, the Senate Report’s purpose statement asserted that the Act:
provides a fair, balanced, and comprehensive statutory system of legal and
administrative remedies in resolving Government contract claims.  The Act’s
(continued...)
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the disputes resolution mechanism(s) (principle five).  Further, as discussed below, I challenge
the premise that, as a fundamental principle or assumption, a system must offer both
“administrative and judicial processes and remedies.”11  As a result, while I applaud the ABA
effort, I find it inadequate as a platform for rigorous analysis.  Yet, the ABA principles - both for
what they include and exclude - demonstrate the complexity of the task ahead.12
III. Laying A Foundation, Or Why Is the CDA Necessary?
Before commencing a reform endeavor, achieving consensus for the need for any change
is imperative.13  With the CDA, Congress injected order, replacing a “Government contract
remedies system [that had] developed in an unplanned manner.”14  Although the CDA’s drafters
expected their structure to facilitate settlement,15 the statute is no longer perceived as an effective
15(...continued)
provisions help to induce resolution of more contract disputes by negotiation prior
to litigation; equalize the bargaining power of the parties when a dispute exists;
provide alternate forums suitable to handle the different types of disputes; and
insure fair and equitable treatment to contractors and Government agencies.
16  Indeed, the statutory structure seems almost inconsistent with the elegantly simple
regulatory policy statement at FAR 33.204: “The Government's policy is to try to resolve all
contractual issues in controversy by mutual agreement at the contracting officer's level.
Reasonable efforts should be made to resolve controversies prior to the submission of a claim.”
17  As one critical piece recently exclaimed:
In matter relating to contracting . . ., the sovereign has waived its immunity and
agreed to be sued.  However, it has placed some limitations and conditions on this
waiver that have engendered continuing controversy.  Those limitations and
conditions relate both to the extent of the waiver and the courts to which
jurisdiction is assigned.  The subject is a colossal mess, made far worse by the
Government’s unceasing efforts to invoke vestigial sovereign immunity in nearly
every contract-related action not seeking specific dollar damages and not brought
in a forum of the Government’s choosing.
Herbert L. Fenster & Stephen E. Ruscus, Feature Comment: The Blue Fox Enigma: Closing the
Controversy Over the Availability of U.S. District Courts in Contract Cases, 41 GOV’T
CONTRACTOR ¶ 64 (February 10, 1999). 
18  See generally, David P. Metzger & Christopher R. Yukins, Using Alternative Dispute
Resolution to Streamline Contract Claims, 39 CONT. MGMT. 5 (January 1999); Joseph McDade,
(continued...)
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catalyst to negotiation.16  Rather, the CDA today serves as a structured adversarial dispute
resolution edifice.  Litigation, ever more complex and formal, is the statute’s keystone and
legacy.  In any such system, both parties rarely achieve complete, long-term satisfaction. 
Dissatisfaction grows for a host of reasons.17  Parties may complain that they do not “win” all (or
enough) of their disputes, or when they do “win,” the costs of achieving the victory are too great. 
Non-litigants may criticize the system if, for example, it promotes disruptive litigation, or creates
uncertainty by failing to provide clear, uniform precedent.  Others may focus on externalities,
such as the cost to taxpayers associated with creating and sustaining adjudicative institutions.
These different perspectives demonstrate the difficulty in pleasing all affected parties. 
Our current system involves a complex juxtaposition of judicial, administrative, and alternative
dispute resolution options, each with strong proponents.  For example, the most aggressive ADR
advocates18 may see little need for reform.  Indeed, ADR proponents may resist reform if it
18(...continued)
Resolving Contract Disputes Through the Use of ADR: Filling the Information Void, 33 PROC.
LAW. 7 (Winter 1998);  Frank Carr, et al., The Untapped Potential of ADR in the Construction
Industry, 42 FED. LAW. 32 (June 1995).
19   Granted, these options are chosen primarily to avoid the worst aspects of the existing
statutory structure and/or the judicial and administrative fora.
20  BCAs require that a notice of appeal be postmarked within 90 days of receipt of the
contracting officer's decision; the Court of Federal Claims requires that a complaint be received
within twelve months of  receipt of the contracting officer's decision.  See generally, PEACOCK &
TING, CDA ANNOTATED, supra, at 7-18 (discussing the date of filing of an appeal or a suit); page
7-26 (distinguishing a notice of appeal and a complaint).  It is a disgrace that our Federal Court
system serves as a forum for contractors or counsel to litigate claims for which they failed to
commence administrative actions in a timely fashion.  In a revised statute, assuming multiple
fora survive, Congress should: (1) simplify the CDA by mandating a uniform filing period (e.g.,
double the BCA period and halve the CFC period - setting a uniform deadline of six months after
receipt of the contracting officer's final decision); and (2) define a consistent method of filing for
timeliness purposes (e.g., receipt, rather than mailing, of the appropriate pleading) and a single
initial pleading type or form (e.g., a complaint, rather than notice of appeal).
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requires abdication of the broad flexibilities to pursue resolution (within or outside of the
existing fora) that they now enjoy under the existing regime.19 Such resistance cannot be
reconciled with advocates engaged in a quest for uniformity in precedent (who assert that ADR
dilutes the pool of disputes which generate published decisions or precedential guidance) or
procedure (who recognize that the flip-side of flexibility is the absence of clarity or guidance for
new entrants or less experienced players).   Any examination, therefore, must determine whether
the primary reasons for reform can be satisfied.
Further, without a clear articulation of umbrella or over-arching goals, it is difficult to
keep the debate focused.  In other words, certain assumptions must be made regarding the
priority of chickens and eggs, before analyzing or attempting to identify the most important
components of the chicken or the definitive elements of the egg.  For example, one minor, yet
long overdue, improvement in the CDA would be establishment of consistent jurisdictional filing
deadlines and procedures at the boards of contract appeals (BCAs) and the Court of Federal
Claims (CFC).20  Conversely, if no compelling case is made for parallel judicial and
administrative fora (leaving a single adjudicative body), issues of consistency between fora
dissipate.
It is reasonable, therefore, if not merely responsible, to determine whether we need the
CDA at all.  If we cannot articulate the need for special rules for government contract disputes,
why maintain them?  So long as some judicial or quasi-judicial remedy is deemed necessary,
some mechanism is required, under our current legal regime, to circumvent the otherwise valid
21  I regard this issue as sacrosanct solely for the purpose of completing this essay within
the PCLJ’s space constraints.  I reserve for another day discussion of less conventional, and thus
more controversial, alternative solutions.  (For example, I am intrigued by the concept of a
private or public insurance fund, into which either contractors or the government could pay,
directly or indirectly, based upon a risk schedule.  Claims, as we currently know them, could then
be brought against the fund, removing fiscal and funding issues from the settlement or risk
analysis.)   In any event, I remain unpersuaded that the integrity and success of our government
contracting process depends upon a broad contractor right – whether statutory or contractual -- to
sue the Government.  Rather, I suggest that we lack empirical evidence to conclude that the
absence of the right to sue would serve as a fatal deterrent to participation in Federal Government
procurement.  By analogy, despite a wealth of literature suggesting that the False Claims Act,
coupled with burdensome statutory and regulatory compliance requirements, deters commercial
firms from participating in government procurement, numerous firms continue to aggressively
pursue the Federal Government’s procurement dollars.  See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Civil
False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation in Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP.
CT. ECON. REV. 201, 205, 235 (1998) (suggesting that contractors regard this “oversight as a
costly, substantial burden of doing business with the government”).  As Professor Kovacic
concedes “it would be an exaggeration to say that . . . oversight, standing alone, commonly
induces firms to deal solely in the commercial arena.  It is doubtful that any single attribute of
the procurement regulatory system has that discouraging effect.” 6  SUP. CT. ECON. REV. at 239
(emphasis added).
22  This language was interpreted to permit actions based upon “remedy granting clauses”
found in the contract. See, e.g., United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 403-
418, 412 (1966).  Absent such a remedy granting clause, no judicial or administrative remedy
was available to a contractor.
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defense of sovereign immunity.  That topic is addressed below.  Other than that threshold issue –
creating the mechanism that permits contractors to bring suit against the Government – no other
vestige of the existing system should be perceived as sacrosanct.21
IV. Divining a Purpose of the Statutory Scheme: Waiving Sovereign Immunity
To What End?
I submit that the fundamental purpose of a contract dispute statute should be to provide a
fair and rational process for contractors to raise and resolve problems associated with their
contractual relations with the Government.  To some extent, this goal underlies the original
passage of the CDA, which significantly broadened the Government’s waiver of its sovereign
immunity against suits brought by its contractors.  While the pre-CDA “Disputes” Clause merely
permitted suits “arising under” contracts,22 the CDA permitted suits arising under or “relating to”
23  41 U.S.C. § 605; FAR 33.203(c).  Accordingly, the current Disputes clause, at FAR
52.233-1, covers “all disputes arising under or relating to a contract. . . .”  FAR 52.233-1(b).
24  See, e.g., Essex Electro Engineering v. United States, 702 F.2d 998, 1002 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (“The CDA to a certain extent unified this process.”).
25  See, e.g., FAR 33.205(b) (“contractor's allegation that it is entitled to rescission or
reformation of its contract in order to correct or mitigate the effect of a mistake shall be treated as
a claim under the Act”); Paragon Energy Corp., v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 176, 645 F.2d 966
(1981) (contract reformation claim constitutes a valid, cognizable claim; “equitable reformation
to rectify mistakes is covered” by the CDA).  Although Federal Courts now have expanded
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1491, the CDA does not permit challenges to the award of a
contract or actions taken during the process leading up to award of the contract.  Coastal Corp. v.
United States, 713 F.2d 728 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
26 See, generally, Thomas L. McGovern III, Is the CDA Becoming Irrelevant to
“Reinvented Government”?, paper included in the American Bar Association Section of Public
Contact Program Course-book, The CDA at Twenty: How’s It Going? Where To Now?, Colorado
Springs, Colorado, on November 6, 1998.
27  41 U.S.C. § 602.  Contrast, for example, 41 U.S.C. § 603 and its special treatment of
maritime cases; the Postal Service exclusion in 41 U.S.C. § 601(2); and certain Tennessee Valley
Authority contracts, covered by 41 U.S.C. §§ 602(b), 609(a)(2).  See also  the Federal Aviation
Administration’s Office of Dispute Resolution for Acquisition (ODRA), at
http://www.faa.gov/agc/OFFICEOF.HTM, and ODRA’s Guide to the Conduct of Protests and
Contract Disputes, at http://www.faa.gov/agc/INTRO.htm.  
Protests concerning FAA . . . contract disputes arising under or related to FAA
contracts, shall be resolved at the agency level through the FAA Dispute
Resolution System. Judicial review, where available, will be in accordance with
49 U.S.C. 46110 and shall apply only to final agency decisions. The decision of
the FAA shall be considered a final agency decision only after [a . . .] contractor
has exhausted its administrative remedies for . . . a contract dispute under the
FAA Dispute Resolution System.
(continued...)
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the contract.23  As a result, the “all disputes” statutory scheme currently permits actions claiming
breach24 or post-award (but not pre-award) mistake.25
Conversely, certain contractors, certain types of contractual vehicles,26 and a number of
disputes involving the Government and its contractors remain outside of the CDA.  The CDA
applies only to Executive Agencies.27  Contractor fraud actions remain particularly vexing.  The
27(...continued)
Acquisition Management System (AMS) § 3.9, http://www.faa.gov/agc/AMS3_9.HTM.
28 Martin J. Simko Construction, Inc. v. United States, 852 F.2d 540, 542, 545 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (discussing 41 U.S.C. §§ 604, 605(a); the CDA “specifically removes from the CO’s
authority certain claims or disputes”; legislative history “indicates quite clearly that Congress
never intended fraud claims to be part of the ‘all disputes’ provision” and “specifically states that
the Department of Justice would be ‘solely’ responsible for these actions).  See also, generally,
Thomas P. Barletta & Barbara A. Pollack, Civil Litigation of Allegations of Fraud in Connection
with Government Contract Claims, 18 PUB. CONT. L. J. 235 (1988); J. Cal McCastlain & Steven
L. Schooner, To Stay or Not to Stay: Difficult Decisions for Boards of Contract Appeals
Confronted with Parallel Proceedings, 16 PUB. CONT. L. J. 418 (1987).  See, e.g., the discussion
of claims tainted by fraud and the stay of proceedings pending resolution of the fraud issue, at
PEACOCK & TING, CDA ANNOTATED, supra, at 2-10, 2-13.  The authors note that “[a]lthough
fraud claims or counterclaims by the Government are excluded from agency [board] jurisdiction .
. . , they may be heard by the Court of Federal Claims under its counterclaim jurisdiction. . . .” 
Id. at 2-11.  As a result, “[a]gency boards are frequently requested to stay their CDA proceedings
so as not to interfere with pending or ongoing criminal or civil fraud investigations or
proceedings.”  Id. at 2-13.
29  For a discussion of the existing (permissive) transfer and consolidation provisions, see
Dorn C. McGrath III, The Transfer and Consolidation Provision of the Contract Disputes Act, 15
PUB. CONT. L. J. 256 (1985) (discussing 41 U.S.C. § 609(d)).
30  See, e.g., Chain Belt v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 38, 54, 115 F. Supp. 701, 702 (1953)
(“tortious breach of contract . .  was not a tort independent of the contract so as to preclude the
action”); Western Pine Industries, Inc. v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 885 (1982) (finding that a
(continued...)
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Government can initiate fraud proceedings in Federal courts or assert fraud counter-claims when
a contractor seeks contractual relief in the Court of Federal Claims.  More often, however, fraud
issues derail garden-variety contract disputes before the boards because: (1) the administrative
fora lack jurisdiction over fraud matters and (2) the contracting officer, with whom settlement
authority resides in BCA litigation, lacks authorization to settle claims involving fraud.28  This
inefficient jurisdictional inconsistency could easily be remedied by: (1) eliminating BCA
jurisdiction; (2) requiring mandatory transfer and/or consolidation from the BCA to a court
(effectively denying the contractor its “right” to election of forum);29 or (3) granting the boards
jurisdiction to resolve controversies involving fraud (which, under the current system, might
entail vesting contracting officers with some level of fraud settlement authority). 
Similarly, a jurisdictional dichotomy exists with regard to tort claims.  The CDA permits
the litigation of tort allegations that arise out of or relate to either express or implied contractual
duties.30  The Act, however, bars suits where a contractor fails to “demonstrate a direct nexus
30(...continued)
contracting officer’s decision should have been issued, thus permitting a tort suit that arose in
connection with timber sale contracts).
31  Asfaltos Panamenos, S.A., ASBCA No. 39425, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,315 at 116,919.  See
also, L’Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 1, 645 F.2d 886 (1981)
(“[T]here must be a ‘tortious’ breach of contract rather than a tort independent of the contract. . .
. It is not sufficient to argue . . . that the alleged tortious conduct is ‘related’ in some general
sense to the contractual relationship. . . .”).
32  This essay poses questions regarding the form and breadth of the waiver of sovereign
immunity; it does not dissect the premises of the sovereign immunity doctrine in the United
States.  For reading that opens a gateway into the morass of literature on this topic, see, generally, 
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 348, 353 (1907) (“sovereign is exempt from suit, not
because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.”); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 797-98 (1951), citing Paul H.
Sanders, Foreword, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 179 (1942) (sovereign immunity “has persisted in
modern law to a degree which would astonish most citizens”); ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM
T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, 342, 525, 532 (West, 1993), discussing, inter alia, United
States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207 (1882) (The principle of sovereign immunity “has never been
discussed or the reasons for it given, but it has always been treated as an established doctrine.”),
and citing Roger C. Cramton, Non-Statutory Review of Federal Administrative Action: The Need
for Statutory Reform of Sovereign Immunity, Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Parties Defendant,
68 MICH. L. REV. 387, 389, 397 (1970).   For an extensive discussion of sovereign immunity
applied to government contracts, see Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and the Separate
Treatment of Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific Performance, 43
VILLANOVA L. REV. 155, 160 (1998).  For a discussion of the broad-based, large-scale assault
upon immunity relating to sovereign acts of the Government, see, generally, Joshua I. Schwartz,
Assembling WINSTAR: Triumph of the Ideal of Congruence in Government Contract Law, 26
PUB. CONT. L. J. 481 (1997); Michael Grunwald, Lawsuit Surge May Cost U.S. Billions, Wash.
Post, A1 (Aug. 10, 1998); see also Edward A. Fitzgerald, Conoco, Inc. v. United States:
Sovereign Authority Undermined by Contractual Obligations on the Outer Continental Shelf, 27
(continued...)
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between the . . . alleged tortious conduct” and the Government’s contractual obligations.31  What
policy (other than mandated inefficiency or the fragmentation of remedies) is served by forcing
an aggrieved contractor into multiple fora to be made whole?  To the extent that Federal Courts
have extensive experience dealing with the Federal Torts Claims Act, what compelling public
interest justifies this jurisdictional machination?
To what extent, then, should the statutory scheme waive the sovereign’s immunity to
suit?32  Should the remedies available against the Government include all of those available
32(...continued)
PUB. CONT. L.J. 755 (1998); Ronald G. Morgan, Identifying Protected Government Acts under
the Sovereign Acts Doctrine: A Question of Acts and Actors, 22 PUB. CONT. L.J. 223 (1993).  
For a broader examination of this issue in the context of the CDA, see C. Stanley Dees’ essay
_____ in this issue. 
33  “[I]ndividuals are egoistic, rational utility maximizers, who pursue their own self-
interest whether they are acting in private markets . . . or in public markets, voting or serving as
public officials.”  RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, at 16 (2d ed. 1992) (citations omitted). See also, Cheryl D.
Block, Truth and Probability -- Ironies in the Evolution of Social Choice Theory, 76 WASH. U.
L.Q. 975, 975 at n.5 (1998) (comparing and distinguishing public choice theory, social choice
theory, and rational choice theory). One major gap in the public choice theory is that “public
behavior can be influenced by the existence of organizational norms.  Organizations are
structured so that decision-makers will consider whether [their actions] will serve the purposes of
the organization. . . . [D]ecision-makers will defend their actions in terms of the public interest
because that is the purpose of those organizations. . . .  Decision-makers are often trained as
lawyers, . . . public administrators, or economists, where the emphasis is to solve problems by the
use of rational analysis rather than by political negotiation and accomodation.”  RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, at
20-21 (2d ed. 1992) (emphasis in the original; citations omitted). 
34  In stereotyping government preferences, a distinction should be drawn between the
various (procuring) agencies, which tend to favor limited, specialized, administrative fora (for a
host of reasons, including the ability to better control both process and outcome), and the Justice
Department, which (for both parochial and intellectual reasons) is more inclined to tolerate, if not
favor, court options (where the agencies cede the lion’s share of their authority and control to the
Attorney General and the Federal Judiciary).
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in private suits, including damages, restitution, specific performance, and declaratory judgments? 
Why should a government contractor be denied such concurrent remedies?  Or, should the waiver
remain limited, such that tangential issues (whether fraud, tort, replevin, takings, etc.) must be
plead and prosecuted under distinct waivers and, potentially, in different fora?
At the risk of stereotyping, contractors and the private bar would be expected to favor the
former, broad approach; government agencies, policy-makers, and counsel might favor the latter,
restrictive approach.33  If these bi-polar positions have a basis in fact,34 there is little room for
compromise. Prototyping each interested parties’ position, however, involves more complex
analysis.  If one party (e.g., the Government) favors a limited waiver and aspires to keep CDA
jurisdiction only in specialized fora (e.g., the CFC and the BCAs), the former position tends to
erode the latter.  The fewer remedies available to contractors (or plaintiffs) under the statute, the
35  An analogy to the last thirty years of experience with bid protests or disappointed
offeror litigation may prove instructive.  Some level of dissatisfaction with existing fora
(deriving, for example, from an absence of available remedies or an unlikelihood of success
obtaining an existing remedy or, in some cases, the opposite) have led to a constantly evolving
menu of forum choices including the Federal District Courts, the Court of Federal Claims (and its
predecessor courts), the General Services Board of Contract Appeals, the General Accounting
Office, agency competition advocates and ombudsmen, quasi-judicial internal agency procedures,
and, of course, the contracting officer.
36  For a more extensive discussion of these issues, see Thomas _. Wheeler’s essay ___ in
this issue.
37  For example, in Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1444-45 (1988), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit sanctioned a significant (problematic) jurisdictional
distinction between the BCAs and the (then) Claims Court. In Malone, the Government
contended that, because the Claims Court lacked jurisdiction over the validity of a default
(continued...)
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higher the incentive to pursue and/or create non-CDA remedies in courts of general jurisdiction.35 
The end result entails less governmental control over the negotiation and settlement process, less
certainty in precedent, and increased hostility and frustration among contractors (the
Government’s contracting “partners”).
An important caution is appropriate here.  Discussions of sovereign immunity must not
confuse ultimate remedies with procedural options or litigation-related remedies.  Issues related
to the latter class of remedies - whether they involve discovery, contempt, subpoena power, etc. –
fit better in the examination of process alternatives, addressed below.
V. Breaking The Mold: What Vestiges Need Remain?
A. Of Specialized Courts and Multiple Fora: Optimal Solution,
Path Dependent Behavior, or Bad Habit?
At least four judicial and administrative bodies (or categories of fora) are currently
implicated in our statutory system: (1) the boards of contracts appeals; (2) the Court of Federal
Claims; (3) the Federal District Courts (which, for example, retain CDA jurisdiction over
maritime cases); and (3) the Federal appellate courts.  As board practice has evolved to resemble
court practice, many question the wisdom of the current system.  Few believe that it remains true
that board proceedings tend to be less formal, and are accordingly less expensive, than court
proceedings.  Election of forum today is a complex decision rarely dependent solely upon cost or
time savings.36  Is election necessary for reasons other than familiarity and comfort with the
status quo?  What benefit - other than the obvious gamesmanship of forum shopping - derives
from inconsistent CFC and BCA precedent?37  Does concurrent jurisdiction provide salutary
37(...continued)
termination absent a claim for money, the ASBCA similarly lacked jurisdiction.  Without
considering the validity of the Claims Court precedent (related to the Tucker Act), the Court
concluded that the CDA granted the BCAs jurisdiction over default terminations absent a
monetary claim by the parties.  See, generally, Steven L. Schooner, More Bites of Red Herring:
Claims Court/BCA Differences In Handling Default Terminations, 2 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 21
(April 1988).  The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2), was later amended to remedy this
distinction.  Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 907(b)(1) (1992).
38  Many in the public contracts bar believe that competition amongst the fora that resolve
disappointed offeror suits led to improvements, or at very least, changes at the General
Accounting Office.  For a recent discussion supportive of the “multiforum regime” in
disappointed offeror litigation, see, Jonathan R. Cantor, Note: Bid Protests and Procurement
Reform: The Case for Leaving Well Enough Alone, 27 PUB. CONT. L.J. 155, 157 (1997).
39  This issue is by no means novel, nor is it limited to the courts in which the public
contracts bar routinely appears.  See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); S. Jay Plager, The United States
Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter Concept:
Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853 (1990).   For a more broad analysis
on this issue, see Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in
Resolving Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1995); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for
Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 67 (1995).  For an extensive discussion advocating the
creation of a new, separate national criminal court system, see Victor Williams, A Constitutional
Charge and a Comparative Vision to Substantially Expand and Subject Matter Specialize the
Federal Judiciary: A Preliminary Blueprint for Remodeling our National Houses of Justice and
Establishing a Separate System of Federal Criminal Courts, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 535
(1996).  Among other things, Professor Williams points to Germany and France’s large,
specialized judicial systems and advocates primarily for a severing of the civil and criminal
courts.
40  For this essay, I use the term “specialized” in a comparative or relative, rather than an
absolute, sense.  The CFC is more specialized that the Federal District Courts.  Nonetheless, its
jurisdiction implicates various specialities, such that Chief Judge Loren Smith asserts that the
(continued...)
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competition between the fora?38  Is the competition useful if it is limited to process issues, as
opposed to substantive distinctions, such as the presence or absence of precedent on key issues?  
If so, does competition within the dispute resolution market lead to higher quality decision-
making, more efficient or user-friendly litigation procedures, or quicker decisions?
Has experience demonstrated a need for specialized courts,39 such as the Court of Federal
Claims?40  How convincing is the literature that opposes specialized fora (whether judicial or
40(...continued)
court “is neither specialized nor general.”  Loren A. Smith, Alan E. Peterson Lecture: The Role
of the Courts, What Would Sherlock Holmes Say?, 34 PROC. LAW. 1, 28 (Winter 1999). 
Conversely, the CFC neither juggles a criminal docket nor empanels juries.
41 Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1120 (1990), citing Justice Antonin Scalia’s remarks that “the disadvantage
of inexperience is often more than made up for by the advantage of a fresh outlook and broad
viewpoint”) ; Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV.
329, 331 (1991) (“A primary cost of specialization is loss of the generalist perspective . . . . a
wider perspective aids judgment by forestalling the exaggerated importance that long immersion
may lend to some social problem. . .”); Richard Posner, Will the Federal Courts Survive Until
1984: An Essay on Delegation and Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
761, 783 (1983).  See also, generally, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts,
Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 916 (1988).
42 As a practical matter, some may oppose such an approach because federal district
courts currently bear a heavy workload.  For the purposes of this examination, however, one
should assume that: (a) the total CDA workload would not be statistically significant to the
Federal District Courts and (b) Congress is capable of objectively equating and/or transferring
saved resources associated with the elimination of the boards or reduced workload at the CFC.  
Obviously, this issue also implicates issues related to the availability of jury trials, which would
be a dramatic change in government contract litigation.
43  For an argument supportive of a multiple court system, which permits a choice of
judicial fora, see Ellen R. Jordan, Should Litigants Have a Choice Between Specialized Courts
and Courts of General Jurisdiction?,  66 JUDICATURE 14 (1982).
44  See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b); Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12, 110 Stat. 3874 (Oct. 19, 1996). 
Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).  Congress has already
(continued...)
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administrative)?41  Can the public contracts bar realistically assert that contract disputes are more
difficult than antitrust or securities regulation issues, which are tried in courts of general
jurisdiction?  In defending specialized adjudication of public contract disputes, does the putative
need derive from the arcane complexity of the procurement laws, regulations, policies, and
practices or the density and intricacy of fact-specific disputes that would numb the minds of
mortal jurors and common judges?
If no convincing thesis supports specialized courts, one obvious solution is to permit
contract litigation in the Federal District Courts.42  Another option would be to give Federal
district courts concurrent jurisdiction over contract disputes,43 as Congress, at least temporarily,
has done for disappointed offeror litigation in codifying an expanded Scanwell jurisdiction.44
44(...continued)
demonstrated that it perceives the Federal District Courts sufficiently competent to handle these
issues, at least for a trial period.  Pursuant to Pub. L. No. 104-320, § 12(c), GAO is conducting “a
study regarding the concurrent jurisdiction of the district courts . . . and the Court of Federal
Claims over bid protests to determine whether concurrent jurisdiction is necessary.”  Perhaps a
similar experiment is warranted with regard to contract disputes.    For a summary of these
arguments in the context of support for concurrent disappointed offeror (or protest) litigation
jurisdiction in the CFC and the district courts, see Michael S. Mason, Bid Protests and the U.S.
District Courts – Why Congress Should Not Allow the Sun to Set on This Effective Relationship,
26 PUB. CONT. L.J. 567 (1997); William Kovacic, Procurement Reform and the Choice of Forum
in Bid Protest Disputes, 9 ADMIN. L. J. AM. U. 461 (1995).
45  The number of potential options highlights the complexity of this issue.  The statute
could: (1) maintain the status quo, permitting contractors to elect between an administrative fora
(the BCAs) and a judicial fora (the CFC or, in limited cases, the Federal District Courts); (2)
broaden the election even further, permitting contractors to elect between an administrative fora
and a specialized judicial fora (the CFC) and a court of general jurisdiction (the Federal District
Courts); (3) eliminate the boards of contract appeals, remove contract disputes from the Tucker
Act, and permit contractors to sue the government only in the Federal District Courts; (4)
maintain an administrative fora, such as the current boards of contract appeals, remove contract
disputes from the Tucker Act, and, if election of forum is deemed desirable, permit contractors to
sue the government in the Federal District Courts; (5) maintain an administrative fora (whether
or not to be called BCAs) solely for limited purposes (such as permitting pro se contract disputes,
resolving lower dollar threshold (e.g., under $1 million), nonprecedential, expedited decisions, or
providing non-judicial alternative dispute resolution (ADR) neutrals, mediators, and/or
settlement judges, or even providing a binding arbitration option, see, e.g., Robin J. Evans, Note:
The Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1996: Improving Federal Agency Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution Process, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 217,  228-230 (1998)); remove
contract disputes from the Tucker Act, and permit contractors to sue the government in the
Federal District Courts for larger disputes; (6) maintain an administrative fora solely for limited
purposes (see above), and permit contractors to sue the government in the CFC for larger
disputes; (7) eliminate the boards of contract appeals and sever the link between the CDA and the
Tucker Act, which would permit litigation only in the Federal District Courts.
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The examination of specialized versus general courts leads to the larger issue of multiple
fora.45  What compelling need is there for both an administrative and a judicial specialized
forum?  If election of forum is deemed desirable, a much more compelling case could be made
for a specialized administrative fora in addition to a court of general jurisdiction.  Who, if
anyone, is served by our current semi-parallel system of BCAs and the Court of Federal Claims
(CFC)?  Whose interests were protected or served by (implicitly) vesting settlement authority in
the Contracting Officer in board proceedings, while reserving settlement authority for the
46  The Senate Report initially explains that the CDA “empowers contracting officers to
settle on their legal and contractual merits all disputes arising in connection with the contract[.]” 
S. REP. NO. 95-1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5235. 
Conversely, the report later articulates that:  “It is not the intent of this section to change the
current procedures for settlement of claims by the Justice Department once the claim has been
turned over to that body or litigation has commenced in court.”  S. REP. NO. 95-1118, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., 19 (1978), reprinted in 1978 USCCAN 5235, 5253.  This rubric made sense when the
boards – as instrumentalities acting with authority delegated by the head of the agency –
provided, in effect, a decision of the agency, rather than the current scenario where a quasi-
judicial decision is available through an alternative, optional forum created and staffed by the
agency.
47  An almost inexplicable chasm exists between the boards’ current role (as a parallel
alternative to the Court of Federal Claims) and their original purpose, resolving contract matters
delegated by the head of the agency head.  See, generally, RALPH C. NASH, JR. & JOHN CIBINIC,
JR. FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW (VOL. II) 2037 (3d. ed. 1980), citing Joel P. Shedd, Jr.,
Disputes and Appeals: The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, 29 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 39, (1964).  Shedd, then a member of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals,
articulated purposes such as: (a) ensuring that accomplishment of the military mission “not be
frustrated by a dispute with [a] contractor”; (b) providing “a means of settling disputes fairly and
expeditiously without the expense of an action at law[,]” and (c) furthering “harmonious relations
with its contractors”).  Id. at 39-40.
48  Last year, the ASBCA reported a decrease in appeal activity for the seventh
(continued...)
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Attorney General in CFC litigation?46
All issues regarding what type of administrative fora is appropriate must be deferred until
a compelling case for a need for any administrative fora is made.  Only if an articulated,
achievable purpose for the boards47 or any administrative fora – other than choice for choice’s
sake – can be articulated, should the BCAs remain an option.  Only at that time, need the nature
of the existing boards be addressed.
If a need for administrative fora (whether or not like the current BCAs) is established,
have we learned enough during twenty years of CDA practice, and innumerable suggested
organizational schemes, to formulate an efficient plan for the consolidation of agency tribunals? 
Is a single administrative forum sufficient (e.g., a government-wide board of contract appeals,
vested with independence similar to the Merit Systems Protection Board), or does the civilian-
military distinction mandate at least two boards (e.g., a defense BCA, combining the Armed
Services and Corps of Engineers BCAs, and a civilian BCA, merging the GSBCA with the
remaining civilian agency boards)?  Do we need fewer small boards or more?  What conclusions
should we draw from the inexorable reduction in BCA dockets?48  Does the historical failure,
48(...continued)
consecutive year.  In fiscal year (FY) 1998, the ASBCA docketed 796 appeals, compared to 2218
new appeals in FY 1990.  The General Services Administration’s board, the second largest BCA
reported that it docketed 139 appeals during the same fiscal year, down ten percent since the
prior fiscal year. The volume of contract litigation in the Court of Federal Claims has remained
more steady during that period (and may have increased slightly in FY 1998).  In FY 1997, the
CFC docketed 280 contract cases compared to 291 in FY 1992.  See, CONFERENCE BRIEFS: THE
FEDERAL PUBLICATIONS GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS YEAR IN REVIEW CONFERENCE, COVERING
1998, Chapter 6, Disputes (1999); Ralph C. Nash & John Cibinic, Dateline January 1999, 13
NASH & CIBINIC REP. 1 (January 1999).
49  See, generally, 41 U.S.C. §§ 601(5), 607(a)(1), 607(c), 607(h), 608(f). For a more
extensive discussion of this topic, see John Howell’s essay ___ in this issue. 
50  Assembling and empowering a proper group poses a daunting challenge.  Nonetheless,
examples such as the Commission on Government Procurement, the President’s Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management (“Packard Commission”), and the Section 800 Panel
suggest potential models.   
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inability, or unwillingness of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy to exercise its statutory
management authority with regard to the BCAs mandate an alternative management scheme?49
All assumptions based upon the current structure must be discarded.  The dense web of
vested interests, derived from a well-entrenched structure built to service the existing system,
must not constrain the debate.50  Little progress can be expected if self-interest or self-
perpetuation motivates any of the following, or other related, groups: government procurement
policy makers; contractors (individually, collectively, or through trade associations);
administrative judges (collectively or individually) of the agency boards of contract appeals
(again, collectively or individually); agency counsel that litigate exclusively before boards; the
judges of the Court of Federal Claims; the judges of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit;
private practitioners (amongst which some favor the boards, some the courts); the Department of
Justice (in which a faction, such as the Commercial Litigation Branch, might favor specialized
courts, while the United States Attorneys likely would prefer courts of general jurisdiction); and
proponents of alternative dispute resolution alternatives (including, e.g., the American
Arbitration Association (AAA) or private dispute resolution specialists).
B. Resolving the Certification Morass; Confronting the Last
Vestige of an Anachronistic Model
A surprising level of complacency currently surrounds issues related to the certification of
claims.  To the extent that the current certification requirements “shall not deprive a court or
51  41 U.S.C. § 605(c)(6).
52  S. Rep. No. 1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978); H. Rep. No. 1006, pt. 1, at 28, (1992),
reprinted in USCCAN 3921, 3937, accompanying Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992);
Skelly & Loy v. United States, 685 F.2d 414, 418 (Ct. Cl. 1983).   Professor Roe’s description of
path dependence as “the history of problems that had to be solved in the past but that may be
irrelevant today” seems apt.  See, Roe, supra, 109 HARVARD L. REV. at 668.
53  Skelly & Loy v. United States, 685 F.2d 414, 418 (Ct. Cl. 1983); see also, S. Rep. No.
1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1978); H. Rep. No. 1006, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., at 28,
accompanying Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992).
54  Discussion at the American Bar Association Section of Public Contract Law Fall
Council Meeting, November 7, 1998, The Broadmoor, Colorado Springs, Colorado.
55  See, e.g., Report of the Federal Contract Claims and Remedies Committee on Ways of
Expediting Appeals Before the Boards of Contract Appeals, 16 PUB. CONT. L. J. 161 (1986),
recommending: (1) better use of prehearing conferences; (2) greater stipulation of uncontested
(continued...)
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[BCA] of jurisdiction[,]”51 do they serve a legitimate purpose, or have they outlived their
usefulness?  Do we maintain the certification requirement to encourage settlement?  Does the
requirement persist because, historically, “contractors often submitted unsupported and inflated
claims[?]” How valid today is the need “to insure that complete clear and honest claims are
presented to Federal contracting officers[?]”52  Has the requirement survived simply because it is
advantageous to “trigger a contractor's potential liability for a fraudulent claim[?]”53   Now that
the certification threshold no longer serves as a jurisdictional impediment, have we come full
circle?  Arguably, the certification requirement today is deemed advantageous by contractors
because it triggers the CDA’s pre-judgment interest recovery provision.  Consider the irony that
the ABA, historically entrenched opponents of certification requirements, recently debated
encouraging the Federal Aviation Administration to mandate certification procedures in
promulgating its dispute procedures.54  I suggest that, in the spirit of objective investigation, any
effort should proceed based upon the assumption that certification – as we know it -- is
unnecessary, yet permit certification proponents to articulate a legitimate purpose for such a
requirement.
C. Addressing Procedural Issues: Distinguishing Deference,
Housekeeping, and Micro-Management
Twenty years of experience have exposed the difficulty associated with legislatively
mandating “expeditious” and “inexpensive” dispute resolution.  Concerns, studies, and
recommendations related to the (apparent, or at least perceived) decrease in speed of board
resolution are not new.55  Nor do they seem to have succeeded.  The absence of progress could be
55(...continued)
facts; (3) more settlement conferences; (4) shorter, less detailed written opinions; (5) fewer post-
trial briefs; (6) more single-judge decisions; (7) more bench decisions; (8) expanded thresholds
for accelerated procedures; and (9) greater innovation and flexibility in overall approach. 
56  Engaging in the debate at the fundamental level described in this essay may render the
issues too remote for many affected parties.  Moreover, although it is unlikely that Congress
would adopt any broad scale suggestion, however rational, the likelihood of some legislative
initiative resulting in legislation is far greater.  Once Congress turns its attention to the issue,
interest groups undoubtedly will seek specific provisions that promote their agenda.   For
example, despite recent Congressional debate over a significant overhaul of the income tax
system (implicating broad sweeping concepts such as the elimination of the current tax code, flat
tax schemes, etc.), only discrete legislative changes to the code prevailed.
57  41 U.S.C. § 607(e).  The Senate Report was prescient in identifying a paradox.  “The
aim of any remedial system is to give the parties what is due them as determined by a thorough,
impartial, speedy, and economical adjudication.  However, it is difficult to be economical, yet
thorough; thorough, yet speedy.”  S. Rep. No. 95-1118, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5247.
Draft (March 1999), Page 19
correlated to obsessive focus upon the trees rather than the forest.  Progress is unlikely if the
effort bogs down with attempts to resolve specific concerns; real reform likely would render
many of the existing problems moot.
Only in the event that a global solution cannot be achieved, therefore, should the ever-
increasing number of minor frustrations gain the forefront.  Given our experience, Congress has
proven more adept at addressing limited, specific (and, at times, trivial) issues than resolving
global controversies implicated by complex statutory schemes.  Nonetheless, including
seemingly small, specific items in the debate may ensure that the broadest collection of interests
are heard.56  Moreover, it seems irresponsible for any reform effort not to consider issues that
could promote clarity, consistency, efficiency, speed, or satisfaction of the affected parties. 
Conversely, the best hope for improving process aspects of dispute resolution may lie in
modification of practices (taking advantage of the existing flexibility in the legislative regime)
rather than initiating further legislation.
This essay does not permit space for examination of the litany of discrete issues ripe for
consideration.  A sampling, however, demonstrates the breadth of the pressing issues.  It seems
logical to ask whether the uniform rules for board procedures, published in 1979, require revision
to permit the boards to provide “informal, expeditious, and inexpensive resolution of disputes.”57 
Is the so-called “Rule 4 file,” arguably analogous to the administrative record in Administrative
58  5 U.S.C. §§ 551-706.
59  While the CDA provides for 180-day and 120-day periods for resolution by the BCAs
of accelerated (under $100,000) and expedited (under $50,000) appeals, 41 U.S.C. §§ 607(f),
608(a), few sustained efforts have attempted to address the resolution period for large, complex
matters.
60  For example, our panel discussion, supra note 1 (biographical footnote), led to a
suggestion that BCAs voluntarily offer parties, in cases not to exceed $1 million, the option of
jointly electing a “streamlined process,” which could entail: (a) a twelve- or eighteen-month
decisional deadline; (b) streamlined and accordingly limited discovery; and (c) a one-judge, non-
precedential, unpublished, but binding decision.
61 See generally, RALPH C. NASH, JR., STEVEN L. SCHOONER & KAREN R. O’BRIEN, THE
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS REFERENCE BOOK, 62 (2d ed., Geo. Wash. Univ. 1998).
62  See generally, PEACOCK & TING, CDA ANNOTATED, supra, at 8-14, 8-15 (“there is no
final appealable decision where the board remands a case to the parties for determination of
‘quantum’”).  BCAs lack authority to certify interlocutory decision.  Id. at 8-15.  See also, John
Cibinic, Federal Circuit Review of Bifurcated Appeals?: Why Not?, 12 NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶
33 (June 1988) (describing bifurcation as the “very sensible practice of limiting trials to
entitlement issues”). 
63  Must ADR be voluntary (or “alternative”) in order to succeed? Is it ADR if it denies a
party access to full due process in certain cases where appropriate?
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Procedure Act58 litigation, an anachronism or an efficient process for reducing discovery costs
and evidentiary squabbling?  Are there obvious solutions responsive to periodic complaints - by
contractors, the bar, government agencies, and private industry - regarding the length of time
certain appeals languish at boards of contract appeals?  Is it appropriate to set - by statute or
administrative rule - maximum time periods for decision after filing or, at very least, the time at
which hearings and briefings have concluded and the decision is “ready to write?”59  Should
administrative fora provide multiple-judge collegial decisions (e.g., utilizing three-judge or, in
the case of the ASBCA, constructive five-judge decisions)?  Are these collegial decisions
necessary?  What are the relative costs (in money, in time) and benefits (in terms of accuracy,
consistency)? Is there an appropriate, expanded role for more non-precedential decisional
alternatives?60  To the extent that bifurcation of entitlement and quantum has proven effective in
BCA litigation,61 should the CDA permit the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit to hear appeals of entitlement decisions?62  As demands for ADR expand, can the
disputes process encourage alternative options without mandating them?63  To enhance
consistency and clarity, why not make the pre-judgment interest provisions parallel?  (Currently,
64  41 U.S.C. § 611.
65  FAR 32.614-1, 32.617(a); Interest Clause, FAR 52.232-17.
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contractors recover interest pursuant to statute,64 while the Government enjoys an identical
remedy as a matter of regulation and remedy-granting contract clause.65)  Can revised procedures
prompt more efficient proceedings and streamlined procedures through the use of presumptive
discovery limits (or constraints on the size of briefs) mirroring those adopted in the Federal Rules
or effectively employed in specific jurisdictions?  For our purposes, prioritizing, rather than
attempting to resolve, these issues is necessary to remain focused upon meaningful reform.
VI. Conclusion: The Need For a Clean Slate
Does the current CDA work?  Has it outlived its usefulness? Does it provide an efficient
mechanism for resolving disputes between the Federal Government and its contractors?  Does it
promote consistency in the administration and performance of Federal government contracts? 
Does the statutory scheme (alone, or in conjunction with other statutory requirements) deter the
best non-governmental entities from offering the Government the best value for the supplies,
construction, and services it procures?  Are the individual or collective criticisms of the CDA
sufficient to merit the significant upheaval a statutory alternative would entail?  Should Congress
scrap the CDA and start over, or should it merely continue to tweak?
Let the debate begin.  For the discussion to succeed, the fewer preconceived notions
regarding the end of the journey, the better.  To guide the journey, I suggest examination of the
following questions, primarily in the following order.
Is there an articulated need for change that only can be addressed by legislation?  If so, is
a wholesale revision required, or will further tweaking suffice?  (The latter alternative, to a great
extent, obviates the need for further analysis.)  If dramatic changes are sought, what fundamental
aspirations for the system or overarching goals will serve as a touchstone?  How broadly should
the statutory scheme waive the sovereign’s immunity to suit?  Which adjudicative forum, what
type of fora, or which options available to the parties will most likely provide dispute resolution
service most consistent with the aspirations and goals articulated above?  What jurisdictional
prerequisites are necessary to ensure that actions covered by the statutory regime remain
consistent with the identified aspirations and goals?  What specific statutory authorities are
required to ensure that various fundamental tenets of the system are available?
Agreement seems unlikely.  Nonetheless, there’s no harm in asking the questions.  We
cannot know where the quest will lead unless and until we embark.
